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POLICY BRIEF
Reforming Unemployment Insurance
Christopher J. O’Leary
BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n Over the past 40 years, the UI
system has deteriorated in many
states.
n Comprehensive UI reform is
needed because of Congressional
neglect, policy failures by state
and federal governments, and U.S.
economic and demographic changes.
n Benefits exceeding revenue from
taxes has left a structural imbalance
in the overall UI program.
n There are vast differences across
states in UI recipiency rates, wage
replacement rates, and taxable wage
bases.
n Benefits should be accessible,
adequate, well financed, and delivered
in concert with robust reemployment
services.

For additional details, see the working
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/317/.

T
he federal-state unemployment insurance (UI) program exists to provide temporary
partial wage replacement to workers who are unemployed through no fault of their own

while they actively search for work. It is intended to operate as a self-fnancing social
insurance program with sufcient reserves to pay adequate benefts for reasonable
durations. However, revenues in several states have eroded over time to the point that
many have allowed wage replacement rates to fall and others have cut beneft durations.
Yet, as the average duration of unemployment has increased in the United States, there
has been a growing need for increasing benefts.
In this policy brief we describe the structural imbalances in the system and examine
systemic causes for the deterioration in many states of UI as social insurance. Based on
our recent review of research evidence we recommend a comprehensive program for UI
system reform (O’Leary and Wandner 2018). Unlike competing recommendations that
would tilt the system toward a broader social agenda, our proposal focuses on preserving
UI’s core role of adequate temporary income replacement for unemployed workers.

Background
Tere are four broad categories of factors that suggest the need for comprehensive
UI reform. First, Congress has neglected the UI program, failing to update and improve
its legislative framework originally established by the Social Security Act of 1935. Te
last major reforms of the UI program were over four decades ago, in 1976. By contrast,
Congress has enacted many changes to the provisions of Social Security, and many
advisory council reports have resulted in legislative updates and improvements to that
program.
Second, the U.S. economy has changed signifcantly since the last UI reform. Te
industry and occupational mix of employment has shifed, as the goods-producing sector
has shrunk and service-sector jobs have become more prevalent. Working at smaller, less
unionized establishments, service workers are less likely to know about the UI system
and how to apply for benefts, and thus less likely to receive them (O’Leary and Wandner
2020). Employers also respond diferently to recessions than they did before 1976.
Layofs are now much more likely to be permanent rather than merely temporary, and
the duration of unemployment has been increasing. Tese changes have increased the
likelihood that UI claimants exhaust their benefts before they fnd their next job.
Tird, the demographics of the U.S. labor force have changed signifcantly. Tere
have been large increases in female labor force participation, and, since 1990, older
individuals have steadily become more likely to continue working. Additionally, a greater
share of households today consist of two or more workers. Moreover, voluntary parttime employment has become more common, fueled in part by the infux of mothers,
caregivers, and older workers into the labor force. Despite these shifs, the UI program
has been slow to accommodate the new demographic reality.
Fourth, policy decisions and policy failures at the federal and state levels of
government have substantially weakened the UI program over the past four decades.
Notably, the leadership and oversight role of the U.S. Department of Labor has weakened,
leaving the states to determine the scope and nature of their state UI programs (Wandner
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As a percentage of
total payroll, both UI
beneft payments and
tax contributions have
been declining since the
last major UI program
reforms in 1976.

2019). Additonally, for many years, state UI laws, programs, and policies have varied but
generally have reduced beneft payment and tax collection systems.

A Structural Imbalance
As a percentage of total payroll, both UI beneft payments and tax contributions
have been declining since the last major UI program reforms in 1976 (Figure 1). While
layofs occur throughout the business cycle, many more workers become unemployed
during recessions. As a result, the number of unemployed workers tends to surge at the
beginning of a recession and then decline rapidly as the recession ends. To support the
countercyclical role of the UI system in the macroeconomy, tax contributions should rise
with business expansion afer a recession trough. However, many states have UI fnancing
systems that are not responsive to reserve defciencies. In these states, an insufcient
share of earnings are taxable, employer tax rates are not sufciently responsive to beneft
changes, and legislatures have sometimes overridden tax increases triggered by low
reserves. Consequently, in several states the overall fnancing system is out of balance,
with perpetual defcits putting downward pressure on beneft adequacy.
Figure 1 Over the Past Four Decades, UI Benefts and Taxes Have Declined as a Share
of Payroll
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Decline in Beneft Generosity
A rough measure of beneft generosity is the average wage replacement rate: the
average UI weekly beneft amount divided by the average wage in a UI-covered job.
Figure 2 shows the steady decline since 1976 in this measure of beneft adequacy. Most
state UI beneft formulas traditionally aimed to replace about 50 percent of earnings, up
to a statutory cap. Te decline in the average replacement rate shown in the fgure has
resulted mainly from most states failing to raise the maximum weekly beneft amount to
account for wage growth. Some states have also explicitly lowered the wage replacement
target. Both changes have interfered with the system’s core mission of temporary partial
wage replacement while workers search for new jobs.
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Figure 2 The Share of Wages That UI Benefts Replace Has Shrunk over the Past
40 Years
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Some States are in Worse Shape Than Others
Te decline in the UI system has been uneven across states. While some states still
provide adequate benefts and collect sufcient taxes to pay for them, most states do not.
Many states have also made it more difcult to apply for and be eligible for benefts. A
summary measure that captures these factors of system adequacy is the recipiency rate—
the share of unemployed who receive UI benefts. Not all unemployment qualifes for
UI benefts, so the recipiency rate will never be 100 percent. For example, new entrants
and reentrants to the labor force do not have sufcient recent work experience to be
eligible. Workers who voluntarily quit or were dismissed for cause, or who received
and exhausted their benefts, also lack eligibility. However, these reasons cannot fully
explain the variation in UI recipiency rates across states summarized in Figure 3. In 18
Figure 3 UI Recipiency Rates for the Unemployed Vary Dramatically across States
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UI application procedures
should not introduce
unnecessary hurdles to
eligibility.

states, fewer than one of fve unemployed workers receives UI benefts. With such low
recipiency rates, it is hard to recognize UI as social insurance.

Principles for Reform
Several authors have recently recommended UI reforms (Von Wachter 2019; West et
al., 2016), but not all of these recommendations focus on achieving the historical core
mission of UI. Based on our review of the research, we propose a comprehensive menu
for fxing the issues we have described here and for restoring UI as social insurance.
What follows are some of the most important features of our proposal.
• UI eligibility should be ofered to bona fde labor force members who are
involuntarily separated from work and actively searching for reemployment.
Application procedures should not introduce unnecessary hurdles to eligibility.
• Beneft levels should provide socially adequate income replacement without being
so high as to discourage reemployment. Beneft durations should be long enough
to accommodate an energetic and exhaustive search for new work with sufcient
reemployment assistance.
• Extended benefts, which automatically extend durations when employment
conditions are sufciently poor, should cover up to 26 additional weeks in high
unemployment periods. Additionally, the federal government should fully pay
for these extended benefts for states that adequately fund 26 weeks of regular UI
benefts, with the understanding that Congress may act on an emergency basis to
supplement the permanent EB program.
• UI fnancing should be ensured by setting the UI taxable wage to a proportion
of the Social Security taxable wage base, which automatically rises with wage
growth. Moreover, state UI tax schedules should be fully responsive to employer
beneft charges; employers with more workers who claim benefts should pay
proportionately more in taxes.
• Active work search should be expected of all UI benefciaries, and the public
employment service should actively support these benefciaries in their search.
• Special programs should be encouraged. All states should ofer work sharing, in
which employees get partial UI benefts when their hours are reduced even if they
are not laid of, and self-employment assistance, in which workers get benefts as
they try to start a business. Furthermore, states should have the option to ofer
UI reemployment bonuses for benefciaries who fnd a new job quickly, and to
experiment with wage insurance, which compensates workers who fnd a new job
but at a lower wage than their previous job.
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